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Introduction
The year 2020 may well be remembered as the year of COVID-19, an 
unprecedented moment when a pandemic upended myriad facets of political, 
social, and economic life. Speculative forecasts aside, at the time of writing, this 
much is clear: in a relatively short period of time, a novel coronavirus has sealed 
off borders, restricted travel, and curtailed in-person gatherings at school, 
workplaces, and conference venues. Whatever meaning, however fraught, was 
attached to the notion of ‘business (and we would add politics and life) as usual’ 
before the spread of the virus has been indefinitely suspended, and global public 
attention daily trained to tracking confirmed cases, tallying death counts, and 
taking stock of the virus’s disruptive social, political, and economic effects.
The links between technology and anti-trafficking—the focus of this Special Issue 
of Anti-Trafficking Review—and COVID-19 may seem topically distant and their 
analytical connections not readily apparent. However, by situating COVID-19 
as an analytical launch pad into the Special Issue, our aim is to spark creative 
interdisciplinary approaches in tracking how distinctive global phenomena 
constitutively overlap in moments of social and economic disruption. And, more 
pointedly, we hope to better understand how issues framed as exceptional give 
rise to solutions,1 including state and non-governmental solutions augmented by 
technology, which may further contribute to structural vulnerabilities.
1 J Musto, Control and Protect: Collaboration, carceral protection, and domestic sex 
trafficking in the United States, University of California Press, Oakland, 2016; J Quirk, 
The Anti-Slavery Project: From the slave trade to human trafficking, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2011. 
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Consider one COVID-19 example that dovetails with sex work, technology, and 
anti-trafficking politics. As travel bans, border containment efforts, and a mix of 
mandatory and voluntary quarantines continue apace, the upending of various 
industries and businesses have left many workers reeling. Workers ineligible for 
paid leave and lacking worker protections are especially vulnerable, including 
(though not limited to) people in the sex trades. In the absence of meaningful 
state assistance, some groups have taken to crowdfunding and found other ways 
to help sex workers impacted by the pandemic, for instance by raising money and 
sharing advice and resources.2 
The use of technology in these instances reveals the resiliency of sex workers 
organising to help people access critically important resources and ease financial 
losses. However, the bitter irony is that sex workers’ use of technology—to advertise 
services, screen clients, share information with peers, and bank online—has come 
under intense scrutiny, not to mention criminal sanction, on the heels of a decade’s 
worth of legislative and advocacy efforts to disrupt trafficking online by shuttering 
sites and holding platforms liable for activities presumed to facilitate trafficking. 
The passage of the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act 
(FOSTA) in the United States in 2018 amplified extant anti-prostitution efforts 
posturing as anti-trafficking protection with sweeping, censorious, and harmful 
effects on sex workers in the US and beyond.3 
 
In our current moment, widely viewed as unprecedented, we also wonder: might 
an already constrained situation worsen for people in the sex trade as well as for 
workers in the gig economy, manufacturing, or service industries such as tourism 
and hospitality? How might technology exacerbate already precarious labour 
arrangements? And what analytical insights from past research to document 
anti-trafficking and technology might be brought to bear in mitigating current 
and future vulnerabilities?
These questions are not completely speculative. They draw on more than a decade’s 
worth of critical trafficking studies highlighting how anti-trafficking/anti-slavery 
‘cures’ produce injurious and sometimes worse effects than the ‘epidemic’ itself—
to use, albeit critically, the language of media outlets that frequently characterise 
2 The Red Umbrella Fund has published a list of such efforts as of 31 March 2020: 
Red Umbrella Fund, ‘Sex-workers’ resilience to the COVID crisis: a list of 
initiatives’, 31 March 2020, https://www.redumbrellafund.org/covid-initiatives.
3 J Musto et al., ‘FOSTA-SESTA, Networked Neo-Abolition, and Sexual 
Humanitarian Scope Creep’, Presentation Paper, Law and Society Association, 
Washington D.C., June 2019; B Chapman-Schmidt, ‘“Sex Trafficking” as Epistemic 
Violence’, Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 12, 2019, pp. 172-187, https://doi.
org/10.14197/atr.2012191211.
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human trafficking as an ‘epidemic’.4 Human trafficking is also commonly 
analogised as a form of slavery, a discursive move that elevates its exceptional 
status.5 Framing a complex phenomenon like trafficking as exceptional authorises 
‘uncompromising [calls to] action’6 to address it, such as rigid border controls, 
and innovative solutions, including technological ones, that heighten state and 
humanitarian surveillance efforts.7 What this research also draws our attention 
to is that efforts to stave off a crisis—whether the threat of human trafficking or 
a virus-induced public health emergency—can obscure structural factors that 
shape vulnerability and contribute to inequalities. People who endure structural 
vulnerabilities during more typical moments—for instance, migrants, refugees, 
ethnic and racial minorities, sex workers, and incarcerated, homeless, and 
working-class people—often face intensified conditions of constraint and 
economic precarity in the face of extraordinary situations.8 Moreover, exceptional 
state and non-state actions generated in response to crises in general9 and human 
trafficking in particular can contribute to intensified forms of surveillance for 
groups deemed ‘at risk’.10 Such surveillance is made possible through data and 
technology—themes this Special Issue takes up.
 
4  See, for example: J Galucci, ‘Human Trafficking Is an Epidemic in the U.S. It’s also 
big business’, Fortune, 14 April 2019, https://fortune.com/2019/04/14/human-sex- 
trafficking-us-slavery.
5  Quirk; see also: I Grewal, Saving the Security State: Exceptional citizens in twenty-first- 
century America, Duke University Press, Durham, 2017.
6 Quirk.
7 Musto, 2016.
8  Consider another example linking COVID-19 to forced labour practices. Amid 
consumers’ panic buying of hand sanitiser and face masks, state officials in Hong Kong 
and New York conscripted incarcerated people to produce these high-demand items. 
Some commentators have framed prison labour as akin to slave labour, see: H Grant, 
‘Vulnerable Prisoners “Exploited” to Make Coronavirus Masks and Hand Gel’, 
The Guardian, 12 March 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop-
ment/2020/mar/12/vulnerable-prisoners-exploited-to-make-coronavirus- 
masks-and-hand-gel, and J McKinley, ‘Cuomo’s Fix for Sanitizer Shortage: 100,000 
Gallons Made by Prisoners’, New York Times, 9 March 2020, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/03/09/nyregion/coronavirus-newyork-sanitizer.html. 
9 Concerns about COVID-19 have informed state surveillance efforts, including the 
rise of biometric surveillance. See Y N Harari, ‘The World After Coronavirus’, 
Financial Times, 20 March 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-
a3c9-1fe6fedcca75. 
10 Musto, 2016; Grewal; Chapman-Schmidt.




Over the past decade, scholars, activists, and policymakers have repeatedly called 
for an examination of the role of technology as a contributing force to human 
trafficking and exploitation. Attention has focused on a range of issues from adult 
services websites and the use of social media to recruit victims and facilitate 
trafficking11 to the utilisation of data analytics software to understand trafficking 
and identify ‘hotspots of risk’.12 For many anti-trafficking stakeholders, technology, 
assumed to be a contributing force to exploitation, can be reworked, and 
‘transformed from a liability into an asset’.13 Yet the idea that technology can be 
harnessed to address human trafficking relies on limited data and a number of 
assumptions.14 
Just as facts are contested in human trafficking policy and research,15 there is 
added contestation where technology is concerned. In contrast to anti-trafficking 
stakeholders’ unscrutinised optimism about technology, pitching its benefits in 
unilaterally positive terms, researchers have begun to seriously grapple with the 
assumptions that underlie discussions about technology and anti-trafficking, for 
instance whether anti-trafficking efforts augmented by technology are effective, 
or if instead such efforts do more harm than good.16 Moreover, as critical scholars 
have pointed out, assumptions that vex the understanding of trafficking are 
mirrored and magnified in the understanding of technology-facilitated trafficking 
11 See: M Latonero et al., The Rise of Mobile and the Diffusion of Technology-Facilitated 
Trafficking, University of Southern Carolina, 2012; M Latonero et al., Human 
Trafficking Online: The role of social networking sites and online classifieds, University of 
Southern Carolina, 2011; V Greiman and C Bain, ‘The Emergence of Cyber Activity 
as a Gateway to Human Trafficking’, Journal of Information Warfare, vol. 12, no. 2, 
2013, pp. 41-49.
12 M Latonero et al., Technology and Labor Trafficking Project: Framing document, 
University of Southern Carolina, 2014.
13 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, ‘Using Technology to 
Combat Trafficking in Human Beings: OSCE Alliance against Trafficking conference 
explores how to turn a liability into an asset’, OSCE, 9 April 2018, https://www.osce.
org/secretariat/416744.
14 J Musto, ‘The Limits and Possibilities of Data-Driven Anti-Trafficking Efforts’, 
Georgia State University Law Review, forthcoming, 2020; J Musto and d boyd, ‘The 
Trafficking-Technology Nexus’, Social Politics, vol. 21, no. 3, 2014, pp. 461-483, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxu018; see also the contributions of Milivojevic et al. and 
Limoncelli in this Special Issue. 
15 S Majic, ‘It’s Blue and It’s Up to You! Policy narratives and anti-trafficking awareness 
in the United States’, forthcoming, 2020. 
16 Musto, 2020; see also the contribution of Milivojevic et al. in this Special Issue. 
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too.17 These include uninterrogated claims that trafficking occurs mainly in the 
sex industry, that women in the sex trades are especially vulnerable while men are 
empowered, and that the general public has a central role to play in identifying 
victim-survivors. 
Less understood are the ways in which power and technology cohere in anti-
trafficking policy and practice and to what effect. Investigating these questions is 
further complicated by the fact that definitions of technology vary widely. We 
understand technology as a range of techniques that structure and are structured 
by power and expertise.18 We also understand technology as ‘co-produced’,19 which 
is to say, its practical form and ultimate meaning is indelibly tied to discourses, 
institutions, and arrangements of power that authorise its development and use. 
Understanding technology as equal parts technical, political, and social is 
instructive in demonstrating how an uncritical embrace of deploying technological 
solutions for complex social problems can increase the repressive, controlling arm 
of the state, as several of the contributions to this Special Issue illuminate. It 
further helps to map the uneven benefits of technology on different actors, for 
instance, when tech solutions benefit corporations more than workers, or where 
technical fixes hailed as innovative fail to address poor working conditions, bad 
labour migration regimes, and business demand for profits.
Platform Regulation and Tech Solutionism
Politicians, law enforcement, and users of social media like Facebook and 
Instagram have issued urgent calls for technology companies to take actions toward 
‘cleaning up’ their platforms.20 These demands are premised on the notion that 
technology companies bear responsibility to monitor activities and content deemed 
illicit. The current default is that companies are not doing enough to regulate 
platforms but ought to. Though there are mounting demands for non-state actors 
17 Musto and boyd, p. 15.
18 This perspective has a long tradition in Science and Technology Studies, where 
scholars have argued that technological artifacts are not neutral or objective, but 
political (L Winner, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’, Daedalus, vol. 109, no. 1, 1980, 
pp. 121-136) and intimately shaped by social relations.
19 S Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The co-production of science and social order, Routledge, 
New York, 2004.
20 Most recently, journalistic coverage has focused on the traffic in child pornography 
and abuse images, with a callout of companies’ apparent failure to properly remove 
such images. See, for example: M H Keller and G J X Dance, ‘The Internet Is Overrun 
With Images of Child Sexual Abuse. What went wrong?’, New York Times, 29 
September 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-
abuse.html. 
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and entities to regulate their platforms, as Tarleton Gillespie has pointed out, 
technology companies have actively promoted the political and discursive framing 
of their sites as ‘platforms’ in order to skirt regulatory obligations required of 
telecommunications providers, while ensuring many of the protections of free 
speech legislation.21 In fact, companies’ profit motive directs them not to regulate 
their platforms, protect user privacy or to be meaningfully accountable to them. 
Yet such critiques have done little to squelch a tide of data entrepreneurs who 
have gotten in on the business of digital disruption, presenting technologies like 
apps as capable of ‘solving’ slavery/trafficking. 
Notable too is that data-driven ‘disruption’ leverages ideas of moral 
entrepreneurship. Kelly Gates has argued that tech solutionist ‘moral entrepreneurs’ 
present themselves as rescuers to humanitarian problems by reframing those 
problems as technological ones.22 Tech solutionism is driven by moral appeals 
that technology will cleanly and uncomplicatedly solve all of the problems wrought 
by complex issues like human trafficking. In this regard, tech solutionism echoes 
other findings from critical anti-trafficking scholarship that suggests anti-
trafficking has become a ‘rescue industry’.23
One of the key modes of data entrepreneurship we see regarding trafficking is the 
proposal to harness ‘big data’.24 Recent work in Science and Technology Studies 
has turned a critical eye toward data science and data collection techniques,25 
21 T Gillespie, ‘The Politics of “Platforms”’, New Media & Society, vol. 12, issue 3, 2010, 
pp. 347-364, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444809342738. 
22 K Gates, Our Biometric Future: Facial recognition technology and the culture of 
surveillance, NYU Press, New York, 2010; see also K Gates, ‘Identifying the 9/11 
“Faces of Terror”: The promise and problem of facial recognition technology’, 
Cultural Studies, vol. 20, no. 4-5, 2006, pp. 417-440, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
09502380600708820.
23 L M Agustín, Sex at the Margins: Migration, labour markets and the rescue industry, Zed 
Books, London, 2007; see also G Soderlund, ‘Running from the Rescuers: New U.S. 
crusades against sex trafficking and the rhetoric of abolition’, NWSA Journal, vol. 
17, no. 3, 2005, pp. 64-87, https://doi.org/10.1353/nwsa.2005.0071, and the 
contribution of Milivojevic et al. in this Special Issue. 
24 See, for example: D Thorpe, ‘The New Sheriff in Human Trafficking Is Wielding Big 
Data’, Forbes, 11 October 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe 
/2018/10/11/the-new-sheriff-in-human-trafficking-is-wielding-big-data 
/#6b70e5857520.
25 See, for example: T Boellstorff, ‘Making Big Data, in Theory’, First Monday, vol. 18, 
no. 10, 2013, https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v18i10.4869; M Andrejevic, ‘The Big Data 
Divide’, International Journal of Communication, vol. 8, 2014, pp. 1673-1689; L 
Gitelman (ed.), Raw Data is an Oxymoron, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013.
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insights that hold important lessons for researchers and advocates whose work 
explores trafficking and exploitation. While state-sponsored data classification 
schemes, such as racial categorisations, have come under intense scrutiny in the 
sociological and historical scholarship,26 scholars have recently called attention to 
the ways non-governmental organisations and corporations also harvest ‘big data’ 
from users.27 Mark Andrejevic and Kelly Gates argue that today’s state policing 
agencies hold a prevailing attitude of ‘collect-everything’ in their approaches to 
data collection.28 This attitude assumes that problems can best be solved with the 
aggregation of maximum information. We see this collect-all approach to big data 
presented in proposed solutions to trafficking. These new forms of data collection 
involve subtle and sometimes intimate forms of surveillance,29 collecting user 
information to generate algorithmic identity profiles. 
In the anti-trafficking field, digital worker reporting apps perpetuate the illusion 
that the collection of more worker data will present self-evident solutions to labour 
exploitation.30 But, as Andrejevic and Gates caution, large-scale databases ‘can 
generate patterns that have predictive power but not necessarily explanatory 
power’.31 Data generated by apps, worker reporting tools, and automation are 
also laundered through a human rights ‘indicator culture’ that gives it the veneer 
of accuracy and objectivity32 despite sizable gaps in data that may also be taken 
out of context. 
26 G Bowker and S L Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its consequences, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 1999.
27 See, for example: d boyd and K Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data: 
Provocations for a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon’, Information, 
Communication & Society, vol. 15, no. 5, 2012, pp. 662-679, https://doi.org/10.108
0/1369118X.2012.678878; J Cheney-Lippold, We Are Data: Algorithms and the 
making of our digital selves, NYU Press, New York, 2017; D Lyon, ‘Surveillance, 
Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique’, Big Data & 
Society, 2014, pp. 1-13, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714541861; J van Dijck, 
‘Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big data between scientific paradigm and 
ideology’, Surveillance & Society, vol. 12, no. 2, 2014, pp. 197-208, https://doi.
org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776. 
28 M Andrejevic and K Gates, ‘Big Data Surveillance: Introduction’, Surveillance and 
Society, vol. 12, no. 2, 2014, pp. 185-196, https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.5242. 
29 K E C Levy, ‘Intimate Surveillance’, Idaho Law Review, vol. 51, no. 3, 2015, pp. 
679-693.
30 See the contribution by Berg et al. in this Special Issue. 
31 Andrejevic and Gates, p. 186.
32 S E Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, human rights, and global governance: 
with CA comment by John M. Conley’, Current Anthropology, vol. 52, no. S3, 2011, 
pp. S83-S95, https://doi.org/10.1086/657241.
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It is also critical to note that the big data collection proposed by data entrepreneurs 
requires a massive expansion of surveillance infrastructure. That the creation of 
a data-oriented infrastructure has been lauded by figures in the anti-trafficking/
anti-slavery movement33 puts into sharp focus how visions of slaves’ ‘liberation’ 
may end up authorising the creation of a surveillance humanitarianism 
infrastructure to address trafficking,34 all the more notable in an environment 
where little if any regulation exists to oversee it. Ironically, for tech solutionist 
data entrepreneurs, the ‘freedom’ of some will require the unfreedom—through 
the removal of privacy safeguards—of others. Furthermore, the tech ‘solutions’ 
to trafficking are to be developed by corporate actors and implemented by 
individual consumers, not through state-level policies, thus enacting a classic 
neoliberal attitude toward the management of socio-economic issues. In this way, 
neoliberal capitalism, although sometimes acknowledged as creating the 
inequalities leading to trafficking, is also positioned as the means to solving it.35
Networked Governance
Anti-trafficking efforts augmented by technology and backed by anti-trafficking 
policies also draw attention to shifting governance norms.36 Prior to the 2018 
passage of FOSTA, numerous attempts occurred to raid and shutter sites like 
Craigslist, Backpage, MyRedbook, and others, which were presumed to support 
the facilitation of sexual exploitation online.37 By upending part of Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,38 FOSTA has advanced a model of 
governance that makes the enforcement of anti-trafficking laws not only the job 
33 For instance, at the launch of the Global Human Trafficking Hotline Network by 
Google Ideas in April 2013, researcher Kevin Bales noted that the hotline may help 
to get a better quantitative handle on the modern slavery problem, observing ‘Every 
image, every second of film is data, that we can use to find and root out to reach into 
those hidden places, open them up, find the people in slavery, help them to step up 
to their own liberation.’ (Jennifer Musto, fieldnotes, April 2013). 
34 M Latonero, ‘Stop Surveillance Humanitarianism’, New York Times, 11 July 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/opinion/data-humanitarian-aid.html.
35 K Kempadoo, ‘The Modern-Day White (Wo)Man’s Burden: Trends in anti-trafficking 
and anti-slavery campaigns’, Journal of Human Trafficking, vol. 1, issue 1, 2015, pp. 
8-20, https://doi.org/10.1080/23322705.2015.1006120.
36 Musto, 2016.
37 Ibid.; see also: M Thakor and d boyd, ‘Networked Trafficking: Reflections on 
technology and the anti-trafficking movement’, Dialectical Anthropology, issue 37, 
2013, pp. 277-290, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-012-9286-6, and the 
contribution of Limoncelli in this Special Issue. 
38 A provision that gave internet providers and publishers immunity from being held 
liable for content posted by users linked to criminal activity occurring on their networks.
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of law enforcement but of a diffuse network of platforms and websites.39 
An anti-prostitution strategy camouflaged as anti-trafficking protection, FOSTA 
illuminates two networked effects that were in development before its passage 
but which have been further extended following it: first, the rise of networked 
neo-abolition policy and practice across borders. Secondly, the advancement of 
a networked policing strategy reliant on third-party actors to anticipatorily police 
networks, pre-emptively analyse, filter, and scrub content presumed to be linked 
to commercial sex, and cooperate with law enforcement.40 This has led to 
heightened vulnerabilities for sex workers and trafficked persons in the United 
States but also beyond, as two of the contributions in this Special Issue 
demonstrate. 
More broadly, the anti-trafficking movement itself has become a counter-network 
to the trafficking it seeks to address, with the way it has united a diverse group 
of actors, including state and municipal authorities, international organisations, 
philanthropies, women’s rights groups, trade unions, celebrities, religious leaders, 
and corporations. As Thakor and boyd have argued, technology-facilitated 
trafficking is destabilising, and anti-trafficking agencies deploy new technologies 
in attempts to stabilise networks.41 Yet, while this anti-trafficking network demands 
the transparency and accountability of technology for its potential involvement 
in trafficking, it has continued to operate in its own ‘accountability vacuum’42 and 
remained surprisingly immune to calls for transparency and accountability for 
the rights violations of migrants, sex workers, and other marginalised groups that 
it has promoted. As many of the articles in this Special Issue show, this is just as 
necessary in technology-facilitated anti-trafficking measures.
This Special Issue
 
The articles featured in this Special Issue offer sharp analyses of the ideologies of 
intervention and governance that have bolstered tech solutionism in anti-
trafficking efforts. The issue opens with an article by Sanja Milivojevic, Heather 
Moore, and Marie Segrave who trace the development of the discourse surrounding 
technology and (anti-)trafficking from the early 2000s to the present day, where 
technology is framed as part of both the cause of and solution to trafficking. They 
analyse and critique four main assumptions about the role of technology in anti-
39 Musto, 2020.
40 Musto et al., 2019. 
41 Thakor and boyd.
42 A T Gallagher, ‘Editorial’, Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 1, 2012, pp. 2-9, p. 3, https://
doi.org/10.14197/atr.2012111.
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trafficking efforts. The authors conclude with a call to anti-trafficking stakeholders 
to look past technology and re-focus their efforts on advocating for humane 
migration policies, and decent work and economic opportunities for all.
 
The next three articles examine different types of apps developed with the goal 
of preventing or combating exploitation. Stephanie Limoncelli analyses three 
apps aimed at encouraging ethical consumption by providing information to 
consumers about the risks of trafficking, exploitation, and child labour associated 
with various everyday products. Limoncelli notes the multiple problems with 
these apps, such as the obscure methodology used to rank them, limited or 
outdated sources, and contradictory information about the companies or products 
consumers are advised to choose or avoid. Furthermore, these apps, the author 
argues, reinforce neoliberal ideologies about the limited role governments should 
play in regulating businesses by locating the responsibility for the eradication of 
exploitation with individual consumers instead of collective action by workers 
 
Apps concerned with the views of workers are the subject of the next article, by 
Laurie Berg, Bassina Farbenblum, and Angela Kintominas. On the basis of 
literature review and expert consultations, the authors present the limitations of 
so-called ‘digital worker reporting’ tools—apps through which global brands aim 
to collect information from hard-to-reach workers about their working and living 
conditions. While these are often touted as an efficient and cost-effective way to 
gather data directly from workers, the authors note a number of limitations, some 
of which are the same that have been plaguing traditional social audits for decades. 
These include that digital tools may not capture data from a representative cohort 
of workers and that data may be vague or superficial. A challenge specific to digital 
tools is that the collection of data creates new risks for workers’ wellbeing and 
safety. On the whole, the authors conclude, digital worker reporting tools have 
limited or no benefits for workers. They also emphasise that technological tools 
cannot address the structural causes of worker exploitation, such as the drive for 
business and shareholder profit and consumer demand for cheap goods and 
services.
 
As a counterpoint to these business-driven apps, in the next article, Annie Isabel 
Fukushima highlights how an app can be useful when it is developed by, for and 
with migrant workers. She showcases the app Contratados (Contracted), developed 
by a migrant rights organisation in the US, which allows migrant workers to find 
work, rate employers, share resources, and seek support. She conceptualises the 
app as an example of a ‘migrant futurity’—a vision of the future as imagined and 
enacted by migrants—as opposed to the ‘homeland futurity’ of surveillance and 
border control currently enacted by the US and many other governments. Using 
primary data collected from migrant workers and survivors of violence and 
trafficking in the ‘tech city’ of San Francisco, Fukushima argues that technology 
can be used to both help and harm migrant workers.
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The next two articles analyse the impact of a relatively new, and highly 
controversial, measure to reduce human trafficking in the sex industry—the 
closure of websites hosting sex work advertisements. Samantha Majic analyses 
the closure of two such websites—MyRedbook, used by female sex workers and 
their clients, and Rentboy, used by male sex workers and their clients. Her analysis 
reveals that while concerns about human trafficking were cited as a reason for the 
closure of the former, such discourse was absent in the latter case. This reflects 
long-standing stereotypes about female sex workers as helpless and vulnerable 
victims and male sex workers as free and empowered agents. Furthermore, while 
only sex workers and their allies expressed outrage at the closure of MyRedbook, 
not only sex workers, but also LGBT people, their advocates, and civil liberties 
groups reacted to the closure of Rentboy. Majic critiques the LGBT movement’s 
‘respectability politics’ and urges it to show greater solidarity with sex workers 
and other marginalised groups, given the fragile gains of the movement and the 
opportunities and constraints that technological developments offer in the pursuit 
of gender, racial, and sexual justice.
 
The final thematic article, by Erin Tichenor, examines the impact of the closure 
of another adult advertisements website, Backpage, on sex workers in New Zealand 
following the passage of FOSTA. Drawing on twenty interviews with sex workers 
in Auckland, Tichenor shows how the closure of Backpage allowed a local platform, 
NewZealandGirls, to hike up its prices and force unfavourable conditions on sex 
workers who had little choice but to accept them. These findings further 
demonstrate how technology allows the overzealous US ‘anti-trafficking’ policy 
to extend far beyond its borders. Tichenor concludes by calling for anti-trafficking 
measures that prioritise community well-being and empowerment rather than 
those that strengthen the carceral state’s stronghold on people’s lives.
The first of the three short articles that conclude the issue also examines the impact 
of FOSTA. Danielle Blunt and Ariel Wolf present the findings of a community-
based, sex worker-led survey that asked sex workers about their experiences since 
the closure of Backpage and adoption of FOSTA. The vast majority of research 
participants stated that their financial situation has deteriorated, as has their ability 
to access community and screen clients. The authors conclude that FOSTA is just 
the latest example of the US government using anti-trafficking policy and 
restrictions on technology to police already marginalised people.
 
In the next short article, Isabella Chen and Celeste Tortosa reflect on their 
experience providing legal and social support to twenty Venezuelan women who 
were trafficked to Austria. In particular, Chen and Tortosa describe how the 
women were trafficked through the use of social media and chat apps. They also 
share how the digital evidence from online interactions between the women and 
their traffickers was used in the investigation and successful prosecution of the 
case. They warn, however, that this does not apply to all women their NGO 
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supports, and thus digital evidence, and technology, have only limited application 
in anti-trafficking efforts.
 
The final article, by Kate Mogulescu and Leigh Goodmark, describes how some 
victims of human trafficking in the sex industry in the US are prosecuted alongside 
traffickers and put on sex offender registries. The result? Both a criminal record 
and an indefinite digital mark that limits their ability to find a job, settle in a new 
community, and see their children. The authors conclude with a call for a careful, 
critical look at the system of sex offender registries and, more broadly, policing 
and prosecution strategies, including in cases of human trafficking, in the United 
States. 
Conclusion
Although the articles in this Special Issue examine different aspects of the 
‘trafficking-technology nexus’, they ultimately converge around several main 
points. First, the role of technology as either a facilitator or disruptor of human 
trafficking remains poorly understood and largely based on ideology, political 
agendas, and limited evidence: more often than not, it simply repeats long-standing 
erroneous assumptions about sex work, migration, and precarious labour. Secondly, 
the currently available technological ‘solutions’ have limited, if any, benefit for 
the trafficked persons, migrants, and low-wage workers they purport to help; 
rather, they benefit technology corporations, reinforcing the very neoliberal 
capitalism that creates and exacerbates people’s vulnerability to trafficking. Finally, 
anti-traffickers’ obsession with technology is a smoke-screen that obscures the 
role of gender discrimination, labour market deregulation, restrictive migration 
policies, and crucially, the rise of networked responses that pass as humanitarian 
yet are inextricably tied to a surveillance capitalist system43 that exploits people’s 
personal data for profit. Not only do these systems and approaches create the 
conditions—including networked vulnerabilities—that exacerbate inequalities 
and expose people to the risks of trafficking. They also draw precious attention 
and limited resources away from measures capable of preventing trafficking and 
exploitation: decent work, gender, economic and racial justice, the free movement 
of people, and social protections grounded in transparency and accountability. 
Such prevention and protection efforts demand political will, not tech solutionist 
cures.
These insights also hold some lessons, even if speculative, in accounting for the 
effects of technology in response to COVID-19. First, community-based actions, 
tech or otherwise, are uniquely positioned to prevent exploitation. Relatedly, a 
43 S Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new 
frontier of power, Public Affairs, New York, 2019.
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robust public health response is needed to contain the spread of the virus and to 
mitigate its widespread effects. Yet in the absence of a coordinated global response, 
we see a surfacing of philanthrocapitalist-backed techno-solutionist fixes44 and 
calls to enlist ‘big tech companies’ for support.45 Placing trust in tech firms whose 
platforms have provided the technical blueprint for state surveillance efforts,46 
cloud-supported immigration enforcement,47 and that have compromised users’ 
privacy in exchange for advancing facial recognition technologies proves limited.48 
It is likewise short-sighted to assume that tech companies are equipped to fill in 
the slack of an otherwise unresponsive state if such efforts are not accompanied 
by meaningful efforts to address the social, political, and economic barriers that 
make it hard for people to avoid the virus in the first place but also to survive its 
devastating financial effects. 
As the articles in this Special Issue show, reliance on technological solutions does 
not necessarily translate into improved conditions for trafficking victims and other 
vulnerable communities. Indeed, if unaccompanied by wider socio-political shifts 
to address structural vulnerabilities, tech interventions may limit ameliorative 
efforts or, worse, create barriers to obtaining meaningful relief. 
Jennifer Musto is an Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at 
Wellesley College. She is an interdisciplinary scholar whose research explores the 
laws, technologies, and modes of governance designed to respond to human 
trafficking and sex work in the United States. Her book, Control and Protect: 
Collaboration, carceral protection, and domestic sex trafficking in the United States 
(University of California Press, 2016) examines state, non-state, and technology 
responses to domestic sex trafficking situations in the US and she has lectured 
and published widely on these topics. Email: jmusto@wellesley.edu
44 W Knight and L Matsakis, ‘Jack Ma Offers to Supply the US with Covid-19 Tests and 
Masks’, Wired, 13 March 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/jack-ma-supply-us-
covid-19-tests-masks. 
45 D A Kessler, ‘How to Fix the Coronavirus Testing Mess in 7 Days’, New York Times, 
13 March 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/opinion/coronavirus-testing.
html. 
46 A Mitchell and L Diamond, ‘China’s Surveillance State Should Scare Everyone’, The 
Atlantic, 2 February 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/
china-surveillance/552203.
47 K Ferrari, ‘How Marc Benioff and Salesforce Profit from ICE Camps’, East Bay Ma-
jority, 11 October 2019, https://eastbaymajority.com/marc-benioff-sales-
force-ice-homeland-security.
48 M Murgia, ‘Microsoft Quietly Deletes Largest Public Face Recognition Data Set’, 
Financial Times, 6 June 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/7d3e0d6a-87a0-11e9-
a028-86cea8523dc2.
ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW 14 (2020): 1-14
14
Mitali Thakor is an Assistant Professor of Science in Society at Wesleyan 
University. She is an anthropologist of technology with interests in feminist and 
critical race studies of surveillance, policing, artificial intelligence, and robotics. 
Her book project, provisionally titled Facing the Child: The digital policing of child 
pornography, is an ethnographic study of the global network of experts tasked 
with the policing and content moderation of child abuse images. Email: mthakor@
wesleyan.edu
Borislav Gerasimov is Communications and Advocacy Coordinator at the Global 
Alliance Against Traffic in Women and the Editor of Anti-Trafficking Review. He 
holds a degree in English Philology from Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, 
Bulgaria and has previously worked at women’s rights and anti-trafficking 
organisations in Bulgaria and the Netherlands. He has also been involved in the 
work of organisations supporting Roma youth, LGBTI people, people living with 
HIV/AIDS, and sex workers. Email: borislav@gaatw.org
